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COORDINATION RECONSIDERED
Richard Briffault*
At the heart of American campaign finance law is the distinction drawn
by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo between contributions and
expenditures. 1 According to the Court, contributions may be limited because
they pose the dangers of corruption and the appearance of corruption, but
expenditures pose no such dangers and therefore may not be limited. The
distinction between the two types of campaign spending turns not on the
form-the fact that contributions proceed from a donor to a candidate, while
expenditures involve direct efforts to influence the voters-but on whether the
campaign practice implicates the corruption concerns that the Court has held
justify campaign finance regulation. As a result, not all expenditures are
exempt from restriction. 2 Independent expenditures undertaken by an
individual or group in support of a candidate or against her opponent are
constitutionally protected from limitation. In the Court's view "[t]he absence
of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his
agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but
also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for
improper commitments from the candidate." 3 But, as Buckley found,
expenditures by supporters of a candidate that are coordinated with the
candidate benefited are in reality "disguised contributions" that pose the same
corruption dangers as outright contributions. 4 Congress can regulate such
coordinated expenditures as contributions, and, indeed, has done so5 in order to
distinguish between "independent expressions of an individual's views and the
Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia Law School.
424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) (per curiam).
2. So, too, not all contributions can be limited. Because the Court has found that donations to
committees supporting or opposing ballot propositions do not influence the election of corruptible
officials, such donations cannot be limited. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley,
454 U.S. 290, 297-99 (1981). Moreover, contribution limits that are so low that they impair the
ability of candidates to compete effectively have also been held unconstitutional. See Randall v.
Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236-37 (2006).
3 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.
4. Id. at 46-47.
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(7)(B) (2006) (treating expenditures made "in cooperation,
consultation, or concert" with candidates and parties as contributions); see also id. § 431(17)
(defining "independent expenditure").
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use of an individual's resources to aid in a manner indistinguishable in
substance from the direct payment of cash" to a candidate. 6 As the Supreme
Court has noted approvingly, "Congress drew a functional, not a formal, line
between contributions and expenditures." 7 This coordination/independence
distinction is, thus, critical to maintaining the integrity of the foundational
contribution/expenditure distinction.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF SINGLE-CANDIDATE SUPER PACs
In the 2012 elections, however, the coordination/independence distinction
at the center of the contribution/expenditure divide essentially collapsed due to
the emergence of single-candidate Super Political Action Committees (PACs).
By one recent count, seventy-five Super PACs dedicated to advancing the
electoral fortunes of specific individual candidates were active in the 2011-12
election cycle, and these single-candidate Super PACs together spent more
than $288 million, or roughly 45% of all Super PAC spending in the election.8
These organizations-including groups such as Restore Our Future, Priorities
USA Action, Winning Our Future, Texas Conservatives Fund, and
Independence Virginia PAC-were major players in the election but operated
effectively outside the reach of the federal laws limiting contributions to
federal candidates or to organizations that give money to candidates. 9 Yet each
of these organizations existed solely to promote or oppose one and only one
candidate: Restore Our Future raised more than $153 million and spent more
than $142 million on ads exclusively on behalf of Mitt Romney in the
presidential primaries and general election, while Priorities USA Action raised
$79 million and spent $66 million on ads solely to aid President Barack
Obama. 10 In the Republican presidential primaries, in particular, single-
candidate Super PACs played a crucial role in sustaining candidates like Newt
Gingrich and Rick Santorum. Winning Our Future, which was dedicated
entirely to aiding Gingrich, raised and spent nearly as much money
(approximately $17 million) as Gingrich's official campaign committee
6 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1057, at 59 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 946,
974.
FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. (Colorado Republican Il), 533 U.S. 431,
443 (2001).
See Taylor Lincoln, Pub. Citizen, Super Connected: Outside Groups' Devotion to
Individual Candidates and Political Parties Disproves the Supreme Court's Key Assumption in
Citizens United that Unregulated Outside Spenders Would Be 'Independent' 10 (2013)
[hereinafter Public Citizen], available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/super-connected-
march-2013-update-candidate-super-pacs-not-independent-report.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OpenSecrets.org
[hereinafter Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spendig], http://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=O&type=S&chrt=V on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (last updated Ap2r. 11, 2013) (detailing Super PA( spending during 2012 election
10 Id. (totaling Restore Our Future's and Priorities USA Action's spending, respectively);
see also Public Citizen, supra note 8, at 7, 20-23.
2013] 89
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR
(approximately $23 million). 11 The Red, White & Blue Fund supported
precisely one candidate-Santorum-and boosted his total primary spending
by one-third, adding $7.5 million to the approximately $22 million spent by
Santorum's campaign committee. 12
Nor were single-candidate Super PACs confined to the presidential race.
In the hotly contested race for Virginia's United States Senate seat, the $14.5
million raised by Republican candidate George Allen was significantly
augmented by the $5.2 million raised by the Independence Virginia PAC,
which spent all its money on ads attacking Allen's Democratic opponent, Tim
Kaine. 13 Ted Cruz's campaign to win the Republican primary for Texas's
United States Senate seat was successful despite the nearly $5.9 million spent
by the Texas Conservatives Fund, exclusively for Cruz's primary opponent,
David Dewhurst. 14 Altogether more than half of the Super PACs and
independent committees that focused solely on congressional races were
single-candidate organizations. 15
These groups not only devoted all their spending to a single candidate, but
they also frequently enjoyed close structural relationships with the candidates
they backed. The single-candidate Super PACs were frequently organized and
directed by former staffers of that candidate. For example, Restore Our Future
was founded on the eve of the 2011-12 election cycle by several former
Romney aides, including treasurer Charles R. Spies, general counsel to
Romney's unsuccessful run for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination,
and board member Carl Forti, the 2008 Romney campaign's political
director; 16 Priorities USA Action was set up by two of Obama's former White
House aides, Bill Burton and Sean Sweeny; 17 Winning Our Future was
founded by Becky Burkett, who also worked for American Solutions for
Winning the Future, a group Gingrich used to run, and Rick Tyler, a senior
advisor for the Super PAC, had also worked as a press secretary and
See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, supra note 9 (totaling Winning
Our Future's spending); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Newt Gingrich (R), OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/presl2/candidate.php?id=n00008333 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review)j(last visited Aj~ -r2 3 ttam ich ca paign s ending in 2012 election
cycle).
12. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, supra note 9 (totaling Red,
White & Blue Fund's spending); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Rick Santorum, OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/presl2/candidate.php?id=N0001380 on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (last visited Max. 25, 013) (totaling Santonirn carnaign spending in 2012 election
cxcle).
13. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, supra note 9 (totaling
Independence Virginia PAC's spending); see also Public Citizen, supra note 8, at 28-29.
14. See Public Citizen, supra note 8, at 27-28.
15 See id. at 17, 23-33.
16. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Restore Our Future, OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C00490045&cycle=2012 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
17 Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Priorities USA Action, OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C00495861&cycle=2012 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
90 [Vol. 113:88
COORDINATION RECONSIDERED
spokesman for Gingrich. 18 In many cases, the candidate's campaign committee
and the supportive Super PAC relied on the same campaign vendors, such as
pollsters, media buyers, television ad producers, and fundraisers, as the
candidates they aided. 19 Candidates raised funds for the Super PACs backing
them, and representatives of the candidates met with the staffs of and donors to
their supportive Super PACs. Republican presidential contender Rick Perry
even used footage from his Super PAC's ad for his own campaign ads, and
Foster Friess, the principal donor to Santorum's Super PAC, appeared on stage
with Santorum as the two celebrated Santorum's victory in the Missouri
presidential primary. 20
In virtually all respects, then, these single-candidate Super PACs were
alter egos for the official campaign committees of the candidates whom they
existed to serve. The donations to and spending by these Super PACs were
surely, to use Buckley's term, "disguised contributions" to those candidates.
Many donations to these Super PACs were extraordinarily large-far larger
than the maximum legally permissible donations to candidates. For instance,
Sheldon and Miriam Adelson together gave Restore Our Future $30 million,
and earlier, while Newt Gingrich was still an active candidate for the
Republican nomination they, together with their daughter, gave Winning Our
Future $20.5 million. 2 1 In fact, at least thirty individuals and four labor unions
each gave $1 million or more to Priorities USA Action.22 By contrast, the
federal monetary limit on donations to candidates in 2012 was a mere $2,500
per candidate per election. 23 Most of the principal individual donors to single-
candidate Super PACs had previously given to the candidate backed by the
Super PAC but had "maxed out" the donations they were allowed to provide
1 Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Winning Our Future, OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cmte=C00507525&cycle=2012 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
19 See T.W. Farnam, Vendors Finesse Law Barring 'Coordination' by Campaigns,
Independent Groups, Wash. Post, Oct. 13, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-
13/politics/35501220_1 paul-s-ryan-campaign-finance-laws-democratic-congressional-
candidates (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("[A]t least 30 political consulting companies
have been hired by both a campaign or party and an independent group . . . ").
20 Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1644, 1681 (2012).
21. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Adelson, Sheldon G. & Miriam 0: Donor Detail,
OpenSecrets.org, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor detail.
php?cycle=2012&id=U00000003 10&type=I&super=N&name=Adelson%2C+Sheldon+G.+%26+
Miriam+O (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
22. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Priorities USA Action Contributors, OpenSecrets.org,
http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=C0495861&cycle=2012 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (last visited Apr. 22, 2013).
23. See FEC, Contribution Limits for 2011-2012, available at
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimits1112.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(providing $2,500 individual limit for 2012 election cycle). Under federal law, the primary and
general elections are treated as separate elections, so a donor could give a total of $5,000 to a
candidate, like Mitt Romney or Barack Obama, who ran in both. So, too, each spouse in a married
couple can give the maximum individual amount, so a couple could have given Romney or
Obama $10,000 across the entire 2011-12 election cycle.
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that candidate. 24 Moreover, many donors had significant interests that would
be affected by the outcome of the election they sought to influence, and were
actively engaged in lobbying federal lawmakers on a host of tax, regulatory,
and other policy issues. 25 By giving to a single-candidate Super PAC, these
donors were able to provide financial support to their preferred candidates at
many times the legal limit and, presumably, enjoy greatly increased gratitude
from the candidates who benefited from the Super PAC's spending.
II. COORDINATED AND INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES
Yet, despite the commitment of a single-candidate Super PAC to an
individual candidate and the ties between the Super PAC and that candidate,
the Super PAC's campaign spending was considered legally "independent" of
and not "coordinated" with that candidate. Indeed, Super PAC independence
was essential to the critical campaign role they played. If a Super PAC was
found to be coordinating its expenditures with the candidate it was created to
support, its spending would be treated as a contribution to the candidate;
individual donations to the Super PAC would be subject to the $5,000 limit
applicable to contributions to committees that contribute to candidates; and the
Super PAC would be barred from accepting corporate and union contributions.
That spending by these organizations was considered legally independent
of and not coordinated with the single candidates they support is proof enough
of the inadequacy of our current law to deal with the Super PAC phenomenon.
We need to rethink what we mean by coordination and how we draw the
coordinated/independent distinction in the brave new campaign world of
single-candidate Super PACs.
Current law, as embodied in the Federal Election Commission's
governing regulations, provides that the spending of a nominally independent
group will be considered coordinated with a candidate only if there is either
some close involvement of the candidate with the group in decisions
concerning the content, timing, and other relatively technical aspects of a
specific ad, or if there has been some transmission of information between the
candidate and the group with respect to the campaign's strategies, messages, or
needs. 26 These rules are based on an older model of independent committee-
in which the committee had independent existence long before the current
election; had a set of political, ideological, and policy goals in addition to the
election of a specific candidate; and, even if its spending focused on elections,
supported or opposed multiple candidates, not just one. Such a group could
strongly support a candidate with ads that helped the candidate, but was neither
functionally tied to the candidate nor an alter ego of the candidate's own
campaign committee. When such committees were the principal form of
independent committee active in an election, it made some sense to require
24. See Briffault, supra note 20, at 1678 (discussing Super PAC contributions by individuals
who reached individual campaign contribution limits); see also Public Citizen, supra note 8, at
27-30 (discussing role of "mega-donors" in funding Super PACs and other groups aiding single
congressional candidates).
25. See Briffault, supra note 20, at 1691-92.
26. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20-109.23 (2012).
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proof of substantial specific contacts from the candidate to the independent
committee in light of the Supreme Court's determination that truly independent
spending is not necessarily helpful to the candidate it is intended to benefit,
which, in turn, "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 27 Such contacts
establish that the committee is actually operating on behalf of the candidate.
But requiring such evidence of substantial specific contacts makes little sense
when the group is run by former staff of the candidate and exists solely to aid
that candidate.
The case that set the pattern for defining coordinated communication was
a decision of the federal district court for the District of Columbia in an
enforcement action brought by the FEC against the Christian Coalition, a not-
for-profit corporation focused broadly on "provid[ing] a voice in the public
arena for Christians and other 'people of faith."' 2 8 In the 1990, 1992, and 1994
elections it engaged in a significant amount of electoral activity supporting a
large number of Republican candidates for federal office. 29 In assessing
whether the organization's activities were coordinated with the candidates it
backed, the court emphasized that "[c]oordination requires some to-and-fro
between corporation and campaign" with respect to the organization's electoral
activity. 30 Moreover, contact between the candidate's campaign and the
outside organization, while necessary, was not, by itself, sufficient to establish
coordination. The court wanted to leave space for organizations to discuss
issues and policy with a candidate as part of the process of deciding whether to
back the candidate. Accordingly, the court determined that coordination
required contacts that involved either an express request or suggestion from the
candidate to the organization, or sufficiently "substantial discussion or
negotiation" between the candidate and spender over the contents, timing, or
placement of an ad to make the candidate and noncandidate committee
"partners or joint venturers." 3 1
The Christian Coalition decision provided the template that shaped the
FEC's coordination definition. Indeed, even after multiple revisions, the
coordination regulation still looks to see whether a specific ad was sponsored
at the "request or suggestion" of a candidate or political party; if a candidate or
political party was "materially involved" in decisions concerning the content,
audience, timing, or media chosen for the ad; or whether the ad was created
following "substantial discussion" between its sponsor and the candidate or
party. 32 However, this emphasis on close contact or interchange with respect to
specific expenditures may be said to reflect naive thinking about the way a
27 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam).
28. See FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 49 (D.D.C. 1999).
29. See id. at 54-81 (discussing organization's activities in Montana congressional race,
Georgia primaries, 1992 presidential election, North Carolina Senate race, South Carolina
congressional race, Virginia Senate race, and Arizona congressional race, and distribution of
voter guides and issues "scorecards" assessing performance of multiple candidates on issues of
importance to organization).
30 Id. at 93.
31 Id. at 92.
32. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(1)-(3) (2012).
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candidate, or candidate's committee, and a supportive organization can
coordinate. Candidates and committees don't have to talk to each other; they
can communicate through the press. A candidate's committee can publicize
campaign messages, themes, and strategies, and reach audiences the
candidate's campaign would like to target, without sitting down with
representatives of a supportive committee. This might have been a bit more
cumbersome in 1999 when Christian Coalition was handed down, but surely
today, with candidates, campaigns, parties, and political committees all
maintaining websites and Facebook pages, and campaign operatives posting
their latest thoughts to their Twitter accounts, direct contacts between
campaigns and outside groups are unnecessary: Why do they have to meet
when they can tweet?
Still, it might be appropriate to require some evidence of significant
interaction in order to find that the spending of a freestanding group with
preexisting policy, political, or ideological goals represents actual coordination
with the candidate rather than independent support for a candidate whose
views are congruent with that group's. After all, Buckley holds that
independent spending is constitutionally protected, and completely eliminating
the requirement of proof of interaction between a candidate's committee and
the independent backer runs the risk that all supportive independent spending
will be treated as coordinated. 33 But when a single-candidate Super PAC is
created and operated by former aides to the candidate, requiring a showing of
direct contact between candidate and Super PAC, let alone substantial
discussion or material involvement of the candidate in the group's spending
decisions, is unnecessary to establish coordination-the current staff of the
candidate's committee and the former candidate staffers running the Super
PAC are highly likely to share common understandings of campaign themes,
tactics, and needs without direct contact. As Representative Tom Cole, the
former chair of the National Republican Campaign Committee explained,
"[w]hen your old consultants and your best buddies are setting them up, you
can pretty much suspect that there's been a lot of discussion beforehand." 34 A
former FEC commissioner put it even more succinctly: "'People who think
alike don't need to conspire.' 35
III. COORDINATION IN THE AGE OF SUPER PACs
Neither the Supreme Court nor governing federal statutes actually require
a showing of significant express interaction between a candidate and a
supportive organization as a precondition for a finding of coordination.
33. See, e.g., Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d at 95 (explaining Supreme Court's position in
Buckley that "the First Amendment does not allow coordination to be inferred merely from a
corporation's possession of insider knowledge from a federal candidate's campaign").
34. Anna Palmer & Jim Vandehei, A New Way to Buy Real Influence, Politico (Oct. 24,
2011), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1011/66673.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
35. Shane D'Aprile, Shop Talk: A New Era in Campaign Finance, Campaigns & Elections,
Mar. 20, 2012, http://www.campaignsandelections.com/magazine/us-edition/314162/shop-talk-a-
new-era-in-campaign-finance.thtml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting Robert
Lenhard (quoting Gore Vidal)).
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Buckley explained that "prearranged or coordinated expenditures amount[] to
disguised contributions." 36  Direct contacts, substantial discussions,
negotiations, or material involvement of the candidate's campaign organization
with the outside organization's activities would appear to be essential for
prearrangement, but under Buckley contribution status is not limited to
prearrangement, and coordination is a much broader and more open-ended
concept than prearrangement. Coordination in the dictionary sense of the
"harmonious functioning of parts for effective results" 37 does not require
prearrangement or direct contact between the coordinated groups. To be sure,
Buckley says nothing about what it takes to establish that an independent group
is coordinated with a candidate, but the Court subsequently recognized that
coordination can occur "without any candidate's approval" 38 and, instead, can
be effectuated by a "wink or nod."39
Congress has also taken a broad approach to the definition of
coordination. In the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),
Congress, dissatisfied with the regulations the FEC had adopted in the
aftermath of Christian Coalition, directed the FEC to "promulgate new
regulations on coordinated communications paid for by persons other than
candidates, authorized committees of candidates, and party committees." 4 0
Although Congress itself did not define coordination, the statute specified that
the FEC's new regulations "shall not require agreement or formal collaboration
to establish coordination" and then directed that the new regulations "shall
address" four factors: "(1) payments for the republication of campaign
materials; (2) payments for the use of a common vendor; (3) payments for
communications directed or made by persons who previously served as an
employee of a candidate or a political party; and (4) payments for
communications made by a person after substantial discussion about the
communication with a candidate or political party." 4 1 Notably, the first three
statutory factors require no contact between the candidate or the candidate's
campaign committee and the outside group spending in support of the
candidate as a prerequisite for a finding of coordination. In McConnell v. FEC,
the Supreme Court upheld this provision against the claims that it was
unconstitutionally overbroad and unconstitutionally vague.42
Following the enactment of BCRA and its validation in McConnell, the
FEC did revise its coordination regulations to address the factors raised by
Congress, including payments for use of a common vendor, and payments for
communications directed or made by persons who previously served as
employees of a candidate or political party-the two structural factors most
pertinent to the activities of single-candidate Super PACs. The FEC's original
36 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added).
37. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 399 (deluxe ed. 1998) (defining
"coordination").
38 FEC v. Colo. Republican (Colorado Republican II), 533 U.S. 431,442 (2001).
39. Id.; accord McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 221 (2003).
40 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 214(c), 116 Stat. 81,
95 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a note (2006) (Regulations by the Federal Election Commission).
41. Id.
42. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 219-23.
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post-BCRA coordination regulations and other rules to implement BCRA's
provisions were challenged by some of BCRA's initial sponsors and other
reform groups as too limited to accomplish the goals of the statute. After
extensive litigation 4 3 the FEC eventually adopted a new definition of
44 45
coordination that included common vendors and former employees 46 in
addition to action at the "request or suggestion" of the candidate benefited or
following "material involvement" of or "substantial discussion" with the
candidate. 47 However, the FEC limited the effectiveness of these new criteria
of coordination in two respects. First, the fact that the person paying for the ad
(or that person's employer) is a former employee of the candidate, his
committee, or a political party only matters if that person was a former
employee within 120 days of paying for a communication. 4 8 In effect, the
significance of former employee status is purged after four months. As a result,
a senior member of a candidate's staff could leave the candidate's employment
on July 1 of the first year of the two-year election cycle, and by October 1 of
the same year her former employee status would be irrelevant. Second, even
within the 120-day period former employee or common vendor status is not
enough to show coordination. Instead, the common vendor or the former
employee must have used or conveyed nonpublic inside information from the
43 The history of that litigation is reviewed in Shays v. FEC, 528 F.3d 914 (D.C. Cir. 2008),
and Coordinated Communications, 75 Fed. Reg. 55,947, 55,948-52 (Sept. 15, 2010).
. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(4) (2012).
. Id. § 109.21(d)(5).
6. Id. § 109.21(d)(1).
47. Id. § 109.21(d)(2)--(3). The FEC's definition of coordination has two components-a
content standard, which essentially means the expenditure must be either express advocacy, an
electioneering communication, or the republication of the candidate's own materials, and a
conduct standard, which addresses the relationship between the candidate and the individual or
group undertaking the expenditure. 11 C.F.R.§ 109.21(c), (d) (2012). "Content" is generally not
an issue in addressing activities of single-candidate Super PACs as these organizations' ads were
consistently either express advocacy or electioneering communications. The real issue for single-
candidate Super PACs is the conduct standard. In cases involving Super PACs supporting a wider
range of candidates, however, ad content may also be an issue. In 2011, American Crossroads
informed the FEC that it proposed to pay for advertisements intended to "improve the public's
perception" of certain members of Congress "in advance of the 2012 campaign season." Holly
Bailey, American Crossroads Asks FEC for Permission to Feature Candidates in Ads, Yahoo!
News The Ticket (Oct. 13, 2011), http/news.yahoo.con/blogs/ticket/american-crossroads-asks-
feq2ermission featue-candidates-ads 150908017.htmlA (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
Those members would be featured in the ads, and would help write the scripts; the ads would be
"thematically similar" to the featured members' own campaign materials and would in fact be
coordinated with the members. Id. However, the ads would not contain either express advocacy or
electioneering communications within the meaning of the FEC regulation, and so did not meet the
content prong of the coordinated expenditure test. As a result, three members of the six-member
body were unwilling to conclude that the ads, even though coordinated in fact, were coordinated
expenditures, and the deadlocked commission was unable to issue an advisory opinion. See
Thomas J. Josefiak & Michael Bayes (on behalf of Am. Crossroads), FEC Response to AO
Request 2011-23, 2011 WL 6094920 (Dec. 1, 2011), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/
searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=3368&START=1189803.pdf (search "AO 2011-23") (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
48. 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(d)(5)(i) (2012). Similarly, common vendor status applies only if the
Super PAC's vendor-such as a pollster or media consultant-worked for the candidate, his
committee, or party within the preceding 120 days. Id. § 109.21(d)(4)(ii).
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candidate's campaign concerning the campaign's plans, projects, needs, or
activities to the organization actually sponsoring the ads. If the candidate's
committee goes public with that information-say, by posting its plans,
projects, needs, or activities on the Internet, and indicating that supplemental
spending by friendly outside groups would help the campaign in meeting its
goals-that would defeat a finding of coordination. As a result, it is not
surprising that despite the close structural relationship between candidates'
campaigns and their supportive Super PACs there was apparently little or no
coordination within the meaning of the FEC's regulations in the last election
cycle.
The 2011-12 Super PAC experience underscores the need to rethink the
standard of coordination to prevent megadonations to and expenditures by
nominally independent groups that are effectively "disguised contributions" to
candidates from breaching the wall between coordinated and independent
activity erected by Congress and sustained by the Supreme Court. Buckley's
determination that independent spending is unlikely to benefit, and thus be a
reason for gratitude from, the candidate it is intended to aid was almost
certainly naive to begin with, and is surely now inconsistent with political
reality. But, as Citizens United underscores, the Supreme Court remains
strongly committed to the contribution/independent expenditure distinction.4 9
As a result, it is crucial that the distinction actually differentiates between
spending by truly independent organizations from those that are effectively the
alter ego of a candidate.
I propose that for any organization that (i) focuses all of its electioneering
expenditures on one or a very small number of candidates, and (ii) either is
staffed by individuals who used to work for the candidate, the candidate's
campaign committee, or a political party in the current or past election cycle;
has received fundraising support from a candidate, the candidate's campaign,
or staff; or has been publicly endorsed by the candidate as a vehicle for
supporting that candidate, that organization is to be treated as a coordinated
organization with that candidate or candidates, and its spending treated as
coordinated spending with that of the candidate or candidates it supports. 5 0
The thrust of the first factor is that if a committee is devoting all of its
election spending to promoting a specific candidate-whether with affirmative
ads or attacks on that candidate's opponent-then donations to that committee
are effectively donations to the candidate. If an organization is involved in
multiple election contests, then donations to the organization cannot be said to
go to the aid of a specific candidate. In that case, although the organization's
spending may benefit certain candidates, the link between a particular donor
and a particular candidate is attenuated. But where the organization is a single-
candidate committee, the connection between donor and ultimate beneficiary is
49. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
50 The American Anti-Corruption Act put forward by former FEC Chairman Trevor Potter
presents a similar, albeit somewhat broader, proposal for redefining coordination. See Trevor
Potter, The American Anti-Corruption Act (2012), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.unitedrepublic.org/docs/AACA Full Provisions.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
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much stronger, and the donation begins to resemble Buckley's "disguised
contribution." Of course, if the test were limited to purely single-candidate
committees, then those organizations could try to avoid a finding of
circumvention by adding some nominal spending for an additional candidate.
As a result, the factor needs to be expanded a bit to include committees that
focus on a small number of candidates-say, two or three or four-not just
one, or perhaps by focusing on a committee that devotes more than half (or
some other very large fraction) of its election spending on only one candidate
regardless of the total number of candidates supported. 5 1
The second factor addresses the concern that it is possible for a committee
to be formed by a truly independent group of concerned citizens to advance
just one candidate, but also to stress particular issues, concerns, or campaign
themes that differ from those of the supported candidate. Even though focused
solely on a single candidate in a specific election, such a group might still fit
the model the Supreme Court sought to protect in Buckley. But the
involvement in the committee of individuals with recent ties to the candidate or
the endorsement of the committee's work by the candidate or his staff indicates
that the committee is very likely to act consistently with the preferred
strategies, tactics, messages, and themes of the candidate and to act as an alter
ego for the candidate's official campaign even without the explicit interactions
that the law currently looks for. The ties that indicate that a committee is not
truly independent of a candidate would include having staff who recently
worked for the candidate, either on her campaign or in her government office;
who recently worked for a committee of that candidate's party; who raised
funds for a current or recent campaign of that candidate; or who recently
worked for a vendor who provides campaign services to the candidate. A
committee that exists solely to promote one or a very small number of
candidates and is organized and operated by individuals with recent strong
political ties to that candidate or candidates is very likely to be viewed by the
candidate or candidates aided as providing integral support to their campaigns
even in the absence of express current interaction between the independent
committee and the candidate. Under those circumstances, it would be fair to
say that donations to that committee should be treated as disguised
contributions to the candidate.
Similarly, even without the use of overlapping staff, if the candidate or his
committee endorses or approves of an organization's campaign activities on
his behalf, calls on donors to give to that committee, participates in fundraising
activities for it, or otherwise signals support for the organization's campaign
work, that, too, indicates that the candidate considers the committee to be a
part of his campaign. Even in the absence of substantive discussions about
campaign strategy, involvement in decisions about advertising messages, or
transmission of inside information, the candidate's endorsement of the
51 Public Citizen found that of the 112 independent committees that spent more than
$100,000 supporting or opposing federal candidates in the 2012 elections, just seven spent more
than 99% but less than 100% of their resources on a single candidate. See Public Citizen, supra
note 8, at 51-53. That number will likely change if single-candidate status becomes a basis for
more regulation.
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organization's work indicates that the candidate and committee are acting in
concert to promote the candidate's election.
Consistent with current law, the fact that an organization engages in
extensive spending in support of a candidate with ads that track the candidate's
campaign themes and are consistent with his strategy does not necessarily call
its independence into question. 52 As the Christian Coalition court observed,
"[t]he mere fact that the Coalition was singing from the same page as the
[George H.W.] Bush campaign on certain issues does not establish
coordination." 53 But when a committee exists solely to support a specific
candidate and either is organized and directed by individuals with close
political ties to the candidate or is recognized as a supporter by the candidate,
donations to the committee pose the same dangers of corruption and the
appearance of corruption as donations to the candidate's official campaign
committee. Under these circumstances the committee's spending ought to be
treated as coordinated with that of the candidate.
This proposed redefinition of coordination is a fairly modest change that
would not affect all Super PACs, as many support multiple candidates.
American Crossroads, which was the second-best financed Super PAC in
2011-12, supported at least a dozen candidates in the 2012 general election. 54
Such multicandidate Super PACs would be unchanged by this proposal. In
particular, it does not address spending by Super PACs that "were
unambiguously allied and intertwined with" one or the other of the major
parties; such party-allied PACs spent $187 million, or more than 29% of all
Super PAC spending in the 2011-12 election cycle. 55 Political parties are
increasingly treating the activities of party-allied Super PACs and other party-
allied independent groups as a key part of their election strategies. For
example, the recently released Republican Party's review of the 2012 election
devoted a substantial section to "friends and allies," noting that this "multitude
of effective third-party groups . . . serve as critical components of the
Republican Party" and "applaud[ed] the efforts of these organizations to
augment the traditional political party infrastructure." 56 Party-allied Super
PACs provide a means of circumventing the laws governing political party
campaign finance practices much as single-candidate PACs are vehicles for
52. Cf. Col0. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC (Colorado Republican 1), 518 U.S.
604, 614 (1996) (plurality opinion) (finding political party committee's spending on advertising
critical of likely Senate candidate of opposing party was developed by party "independently and
not pursuant to a general or particular understanding with a candidate" and therefore could not be
considered coordinated with candidate). Although the concept of a political party spending
independently in support of its own candidate articulated by the Colorado Republican I plurality
is an odd one, it does not preclude my proposal. Party campaign committees typically support a
host of candidates; they are less likely to be stalking horses for specific candidates. As a result, it
cannot be said that donations to the party committee are no more than disguised donations to
specific candidates.
53 FEC v. Christian Coal., 52 F. Supp. 2d 45, 95 (D.D.C. 1999).
54. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 2012 Outside Spending, supra note 9 fdetailing Super
PAC spending during 2012 election cycle).
5 See Public Citizen, supra note 8, at 10.
56 See Republican Nat'l Comm., Growth & Opportunity Project 44 (2013), available at
http://growthopp.gop.com/default.aspx (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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evading the rules governing contributions to candidates. However, the proper
campaign finance role of the political parties is a more complex subject,
beyond the scope of this piece. 57
Yet, although limited in scope, the proposal does address a crucial point.
A fundamental feature of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) is its
requirement that federal candidates centralize their donations, spending, and
campaign finance by designating a single authorized campaign committee. 58
This was intended to prevent the use of multiple campaign committees to
circumvent campaign finance restrictions and requirements. In 1940, after
Congress first imposed limits on donations to and spending by national party
committees, the parties and their presidential candidates responded by
proliferating a host of independent committees, like the Associated Willkie
Clubs of America and the National Committee of Independent Voters for
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Henry A. Wallace that effectively evaded those
limits. 59 That set a pattern, followed in 1944 and after. As one leading
campaign finance scholar found in 1960, a principal effect of limits was "to
encourage an increase in the number of political organizations through which
gifts are received and political campaigns are carried out." 6 0 The resulting
"multiplicity of campaign groups contributes to diffusion of control, hence to
inefficiency and irresponsibility." 6 1 Not only were limits avoided but the flow
of campaign money became more difficult to trace, even with disclosure
requirements.
The central thrust of FECA's single authorized committee requirement
was to make contribution limits effective and candidate campaign finance
activity more transparent. Single-candidate Super PACs staffed by former
aides to the candidate threaten to undo this signal accomplishment by enabling
candidates to have, in effect, more than one campaign committee. So, too, they
subvert the contribution/expenditure and coordinated/independent expenditure
distinctions central to campaign finance law by permitting "disguised
contributions" that raise all the corruption dangers of contributions to
candidates to be treated as independent expenditures.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's insistence that independent spending does not pose
dangers of corruption or the appearance of corruption has been doubtful from
the start, as candidates are surely aware of and gratified by the support
5 The proposal also does not address the activities of single-candidate independent
committees that are not Super PACs, but operate instead as 501(c) organizations. See, e.g., Public
Citizen, supra note 8, at 11 (indicating that in 2012 election, single-candidate committees other
than Super PACs spent $65 million). These groups present complex constitutional and regulatory
issues beyond the reach of this piece.
58 See 2 U.S.C. § 432(e)(1) (2006). The law makes one exception, permitting candidates to
establish joint fundraising committees with other candidates. See id. § 432(e)(3)(A)(ii).
See Louise Overacker, Campaign Finance in the Presidential Election of 1940, 35 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 701, 708-09 (1941).
60 Alexander Heard, The Costs of Democracy 348 (1960).
61. Id.
100 [Vol. 113:88
COORDINATION RECONSIDERED
provided by independent groups, much as members of the public may be
concerned about how that gratitude could affect official decisionmaking by
successful candidates after the election. But there is at least some constitutional
claim to recognizing the expressive and associational rights of groups-like
the Christian Coalition-that have existence independent of a specific election
campaign and policies and goals apart from and in addition to the election of a
single, specific candidate. Single-candidate committees established and
operated by recent former staff to the candidate or hailed by the candidate as
organizations to which financial backers of the candidate should send their
funds, however, are not independent in the sense that Buckley sought to
protect. Rather, their spending flouts Buckley's contribution/expenditure
distinction.
The explosion of independent spending funded by Super PACs and other
organizations in the last two election cycles raises new questions about the
effectiveness of contribution limits and, perhaps, about the value of
maintaining them. 62 But if the law is to continue to limit contributions because
of the dangers of corruption and the appearance of corruption they pose, and to
maintain the integrity of the contribution/expenditure distinction that has been
a foundational part of our campaign finance law for nearly four decades, it is
essential to redefine coordination to address the emergence of single-candidate
Super PACs. The proposal in this Essay is intended as a contribution to that
process.
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62. President Obama's former top political adviser recently called for the elimination of
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judgment).
2013] 101
